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Abstract
This essay provides a medical theory that could clarify enigmas surrounding the 
historical Socrates. It offers textual evidence that Socrates had temporal lobe epi-
lepsy and that its two types of seizure manifested as recurrent voices and peculiar 
behaviour, both of which were notorious hallmarks of Socrates. Common and imme-
diate criticisms against the methodology of retrospective diagnosis are addressed 
first. Next, the diagnostic reasoning is presented in detail. The possibility of tempo-
ral lobe personality in Socrates is also considered. The important implication of this 
theory is that one of the charges against Socrates, introducing new divinities, was a 
now well-known neurologic symptom.
Cet essai développe une théorie médicale qui pourrait clarifier l’énigme entourant le 
Socrate historique. Il apporte des preuves textuelles que Socrate souffrait d’épilep-
sie temporale, laquelle se manifestait par deux types de crise, le fait d’entendre des 
voix et un comportement étrange, deux caractéristiques notoires de Socrate. Dans un 
premier temps, les critiques habituelles et immédiates formulées contre la méthode 
du diagnostic rétrospectif sont examinées. Ensuite est présenté en détail le raisonne-
ment diagnostique. La possibilité que Socrate ait possédé une personnalité épilep-
tique temporale est également considérée. Cette théorie implique principalement 
qu’une des charges retenues contre Socrate, le fait d’introduire de nouvelles divinités, 
était un symptôme neurologique aujourd’hui bien connu.
Introduction
This contribution from medicine, or more specifically neurology, is made 
in the spirit of interdisciplinary inquiry into the enigmas surrounding the 
trial and execution of Socrates. Here, I submit a theory that at least some 
of the enigmas can be clarified if we understand that Socrates had a med-
ical condition, temporal lobe epilepsy in contemporary medical terminol-
ogy, without its being recognized at that time. According to this theory, he 
was an epileptic visionary who was extremely talented intellectually but was 
eventually rejected by his contemporary community due to his eccentric 
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and nonconforming behaviour and remarks. Some of his odd behaviour and 
remarks originated, at least in part, in his neurological condition but were 
never understood as such by his peers, or even himself.
The methodology of this claim is called pathography or retrospective 
diagnosis. This methodology is admittedly controversial, and I have already 
addressed many criticisms of this approach elsewhere, and offered my reply 
and defence.1 Since this methodological objection is often the reason for 
rejecting medical theories of a historical figure, and such has been the case 
for Socrates, I first review previously published medical analyses of Socrates 
briefly and then discuss the points of controversy over retrospective diag-
nosis. I maintain that this somewhat unorthodox and defensive structure 
is justified, lest readers give up on reading the rest of this article based on 
the prevailing skepticism toward retrospective diagnosis. After these back-
ground reviews, I present diagnostic reasoning and its implications for the 
historical Socrates, concentrating on a potential contribution to the existing 
understanding of Socrates’ behaviour, which is a key to understanding the 
enigmas surrounding his trial and execution.
I am not a philosopher or classicist, but a neurologist also interested in 
philosophy. Reading the primary sources in the original language is beyond 
my ability. I rely on well-established translations and interpretations of 
the primary sources.2 Numerous nonmedical theories to explain the odd 
behaviour and remarks of Socrates have been published, and going over each 
of these is beyond the scope of this essay due to space limitations.3 Suffice 
it to say that the sheer volume of these diverse theories and opinions may 
suggest no reasonable agreement among Socratic scholars on the nature of 
Socrates’ enigmatic behaviour and remarks.4 My discussion is mostly limited 
to the three ancient authors, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, who were 
contemporaneous witnesses of Socrates’ behaviour and remarks.
1 Muramoto 2014.
2 Translations used are as follows: For Plato, Cooper 1997; for Xenophon, March-
ant and Todd 1988; for Aristophanes, Arrowsmith 1969. In my original work, I col-
laborated with a classicist proficient in classical languages (Muramoto and Englert 
2006).
3 To name several representative publications that I consulted on this subject in 
philosophy, classics, and history, Guthrie 1971; Edmunds 1986; Nussbaum 1985; Reeve 
1989; 2000; Vlastos 1991; McPherran 1996; Joyal 1997; 2005; Brickhouse and Smith 
2000; 2004; 2005; Kraut 2000; Smith and Woodruff 2000; Vlastos et al. 2000; Brisson 
2005; Destrée 2005; Dorion 2005; McPherran 2005; Narcy 2005; Van Riel 2005; Weiss 
2005; Bussanich 2006; Long 2006; Nails 2006; Waterfield 2009a; 2009b; Hughes 2011.
4 According to Bussanich (2006: 206), Gregory Vlastos was quoted as saying that 
Socrates’ daimonion is “the gravest of the difficulties we all have to face in our effort 
to make sense of Socrates.”
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A Brief Overview of Previous Medical Theories on Socrates’ 
Behaviour
Possible medical conditions, particularly mental disorders, that might have 
afflicted Socrates have been mentioned sporadically. Even his contempo-
rary, Xenophon, already wrote that some might think that the daimonion, or 
personal voice that only Socrates could hear and that he variously called the 
“divine sign,” the “spiritual sign,” and “my prophetic power” was a delusion 
due to the fear of execution. Xenophon disagreed with this theory.5 Accord-
ing to Owsei Temkin, a medical historian, the seventeenth-century French 
physician Jean Taxil quoted Aristotle as listing Socrates as an epileptic, along 
with Heracles, Empedocles, and Plato. Taxil’s thesis was that all demoniacs 
were epileptic, and he used the word “epileptic” too loosely.6 Taxil apparently 
misinterpreted the Aristotelian Problems, which listed these philosophers as 
“melancholic.” In fact, a careful reading of the Aristotelian Problems, Book 
XXX.1, indicates that only Heracles is considered epileptic, and all the phi-
losophers in the list are merely melancholic.7 Nonetheless, Taxil set a tradi-
tion of considering these Greek philosophers as “epileptic.”
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, when modern scientific 
understanding of medical and psychiatric conditions started to evolve, 
more medically oriented theories emerged. Joyal concisely reviews such 
theories.8 The French philosopher and physician Lélut considered Socrates 
mad because of his hallucinations and delusions.9 Meanwhile, the English 
classicist Jackson agreed that Socrates was subject to hallucinations, yet he 
rejected Lélut’s claim that he was also delusional.10 In his book A History 
of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell raised the possibility of insanity.11 
The possibility of epilepsy in the modern concept was first mentioned by 
the pioneering Harvard epileptologist William G. Lennox,12 who included 
5 Xenophon. Memorabilia IV.8.1. Cf. Harris (2013, 297), “... while Socrates’ disci-
ples evidently treated the phenomenon [daimonion] with respect, there seems to be 
no evidence that even his numerous contemporary detractors tried to use it as proof 
that he was mad.”
6 Temkin 1971: 161; Taxil 1602.
7 Hett 1970.
8 Joyal 1997: 47, footnote11.
9 Lélut 1856: 173–174.
10 Jackson 1874: 241–242.
11 Russell 1947: 109. “There seems hardly any doubt that the historical Socrates 
claimed to be guided by an oracle or daimon. Whether this was analogous to what 
a Christian would call the voice of conscience, or whether it appeared to him as an 
actual voice, it is impossible to know. Joan of Arc was inspired by voices, which are a 
common symptom of insanity. Socrates was liable to cataleptic trances; at least, that 
seems the natural explanation of such an incident as occurred once when he was on 
military service.”
12 Lennox 1960: 703.
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one sentence in his 1960 textbook about the possibility of temporal lobe epi-
lepsy in reference to Symposium 174d–175c. While the present author, along 
with Walter Englert, presented more systematic evidence for temporal lobe 
epilepsy than Lennox in 2006,13 we failed to cite one previous work, which 
only recently came to our attention: Naso and Vera had already pointed out 
similar textual evidence of Socrates’ epilepsy.14 The major difference from our 
study is their conclusion that Socrates had the sacred disease. As discussed 
later,15 we do not believe that he did. In her comprehensive biography of Soc-
rates, the historian Bettany Hughes also mentioned the possibility of “petit 
mal” and “cataleptic seizures.”16
At any rate, these theories have been almost completely rejected or dis-
missed by the current mainstream scholarship on Socrates. For example, 
referring to such past attempts to attribute Socrates’ behaviour to medi-
cal conditions, Joyal wrote, “To be sure, it is in research on the divine sign 
that some of the low points in the history of Socratic scholarship have been 
plumbed.”17 In the next section, I review several reasons for the rejection of 
medical theories in general and retrospective diagnosis in particular and 
provide a preliminary defence.
A Brief Overview of the Controversy over Retrospective Diagnosis
The most common and fundamental resistance to this approach among 
philosophers, classicists, and historians, or more broadly, scholars in the 
humanities and social sciences, is the charge of reductionism. The critics 
would argue that medicine and science cannot and should not explain away 
the complexity and richness of our understanding of human history and 
historical figures.18 Another concern is diachronic differences in the ontol-
ogy, epistemology, and semantics of human diseases. The critics are skep-
tical about the past existence and knowledge of medical conditions that we 
can describe and diagnose today. For this reason, they reject retrospective 
13 Muramoto and Englert 2006.
14 Naso and Vera 1996.
15 See footnote 62.
16 Hughes 2011: Introduction, third section, second paragraph. Petit mal and 
temporal lobe epilepsy differ in terms of pathophysiology and clinical manifes-
tations, even though laypersons often describe the symptoms of complex partial 
seizure mistakenly as “petit mal.” There is no such terminology or concept as a “cata-
leptic seizure” in modern epileptology.
17 Joyal 1997: 47.
18 According to this line of thought, Socrates’ odd behaviour and remarks are sui 
generis and not subject to scientific or medical analysis. Another reason for wide-
spread resistance against reductionism is religion-based. In the case of Socrates, 
Smith and Woodruff (2000: 7) commented, “we can see why people would fear that 
the general use of reductive arguments would lead to atheism.”
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diagnosis as too speculative and anachronistic.19 Furthermore, there seems 
to be a deep-seated prejudice against any medical and mental condition and 
disability, even among the academic community, perhaps because they feel 
that illness and disability somehow devalue the academic and social esteem 
of a person. The label of mental illness has been used to attack and discredit 
academic and political opponents,20 which would only aggravate discrimina-
tion against people with mental and physical disabilities. For all these rea-
sons, few scholars are willing to examine such a theory with an open mind.
Let me first clarify where I agree with the critics: I agree that a type of 
medical reductionism that reduces a social, political, or historical event into 
an encompassing medical explanation is absolutely untenable; human social 
interactions are far more complex than a medical explanation. I also agree 
that publishing a medical diagnosis of a historical person could have serious 
ethical implications, including those for his or her esteem and reputation.21 
Regarding anachronism, I readily admit that many problematic cases of 
anachronism were published in the past, as discussed shortly.
On the other hand, I maintain that explaining someone’s specific 
behaviour from a medical and neuropsychiatric viewpoint does not neces-
sarily entail reductionism. Nor is this an attempt to debase a historical figure 
by applying a label of “insane” or “crazy.” If a medical theory is presented as 
an overarching explanation of a key action of a historical person or a major 
historical event, I believe it is a short-circuited reductionism. If, in contrast, 
a medical theory can fill gaps in our understanding of a specific behaviour 
and deepen our views of the person, it is not a case of reductionism, but of 
enrichment. Almost every one of us has medical conditions at some point in 
our lives, which affect our behaviour, thoughts, and remarks. Some of such 
behaviour cannot be understood fully unless it is examined in the context 
of the underlying medical conditions. Why should a historical person be 
treated differently by excluding such an approach? The theory I present here 
is intended to complement existing theories on the historical Socrates, not 
to refute or replace them.22
Regarding the charge of retrospective diagnosis being too speculative 
and anachronistic, I have already provided a lengthy reply elsewhere.23 In 
my view, this criticism originates in the critic’s confusion and conflation 
between nosology, or the scientific classification of diseases, and medical 
diagnosis, which is fundamentally hypothesis building under the uncer-
tainty of a physician–patient encounter. In this sense, almost every medical 
19 Leven 2004; Karenberg and Moog 2004; Karenberg 2009.
20 For example, according to Ahonen (2014, 223), “‘Madman’ was among the 
favourite insults exchanged by ancient philosophers.”
21 Muramoto 2014: 8–9.
22 See footnote 84 for further clarification.
23 Muramoto 2014.
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diagnosis, particularly clinical diagnosis, is speculative even today, in that it 
is almost always a probabilistic judgment under uncertainty. Clinicians work 
most of the time based on a working hypothesis built from limited infor-
mation about a patient using Bayesian probabilistic judgment24 at each turn 
of events. The clinician’s judgment is not what is true or false, but what is 
more or less likely. They work toward the higher likelihood as the working 
hypothesis (what is most likely) and then adjust it at the next turn of events, 
using another Bayesian statistical judgment.25 This reality contrasts with a 
widespread misconception, particularly among nonclinician medical histo-
rians and medical humanists, that a medical diagnosis must be either correct 
or wrong, when a “correct” diagnosis is merely a more likely diagnosis more 
congruent with what we know about the patient than a “wrong” diagnosis. 
Thus, like most other medical diagnoses, I do not claim that the diagnosis of 
the historical Socrates is “correct” in the sense of the misconceived notion of 
medical diagnosis as a binary judgment. Here I claim merely that this retro-
spective diagnosis is more congruent with what we know about the historical 
Socrates than other theories.
Regarding the charge of anachronism, there are interesting and complex 
ontological and epistemological challenges, which I also addressed in my 
previous article. Here, I briefly introduce this challenge using epilepsy as an 
example. We now have the modern concept and definition of epilepsy. Let 
us call this epilepsy-modern. We also have the ancient concepts and defini-
tions of epilepsy, as described in the Hippocratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian 
corpora, among others. Call this epilepsy-ancient. With these definitions 
and concepts, there are three approaches to understanding the condition 
of a historical figure as “epilepsy.” (1) A standard approach is to analyze that 
person’s presentation in terms of epilepsy-modern. This approach primar-
ily uses the modern knowledge of epilepsy, using epilepsy-ancient only as a 
secondary consideration. This is standard because there are simply no other 
ways for modern physicians to meaningfully evaluate any patient, historical 
or modern.26 (2) We could analyze the historical person using only epilep-
sy-ancient. This is purely the work of historians and classicists. The question 
24 Muramoto 2014: 7–8. The major difference between retrospective diagnosis 
and modern clinical diagnosis is that the latter can always be corrected by the next 
new information we obtain in a clinical context, whereas no such opportunity is 
available for retrospective diagnosis, because it is a hypothesis about a past event. In 
this sense, retrospective diagnosis is viewed as unverifiable, which is a major source 
of frustration for critics who accept only scientific verifiability.
25 To emphasize this dynamic aspect of medical diagnosis, recent medical edu-
cation tends to use the term “medical decision-making” in place of the traditional 
“medical diagnosis.”
26 For a cautious affirmation of this approach for retrospective diagnosis, see 
Grmek 1989: 2: “We have no choice but to express ourselves in the medical idi-
oms—using the terms and, more significantly, the concepts—of our own time.” This 
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is whether a historical figure had epilepsy according to ancient standards. 
For this project, modern medical knowledge could distort the analysis from 
modern perspectives, and there is no place for modern physicians to con-
tribute. Unfortunately, since the results of such studies can be interpreted 
only in the context of ancient knowledge, any further analysis using modern 
concepts and logic is necessarily anachronistic. (3) The most problematic 
approach is to equate or conflate epilepsy-ancient and epilepsy-modern and 
mix the terms and concepts together. While some scholars simply equate the 
“sacred disease,” as described in the Hippocratic corpus, with epilepsy-mod-
ern, this is a typical and glaring case of anachronism; there are many condi-
tions that are included in one but not in the other.27 To sum up, approach (3) 
is an obvious case of anachronism, while approach (2) is anachronistic if and 
when analyzed in our modern discourse. That means that approach (1) is the 
only way to analyze a historical person using modern medical understand-
ing and discuss the significance from our perspective. Obviously, however, 
it is still extremely important not to mix the concepts and terms of modern 
medicine and ancient sources, lest we fall into the trap of approach (3).
What Is Temporal Lobe Epilepsy?
Having defended against a common, immediate, and blanket rejection of 
this methodology, I now introduce the basic diagnostic concept of temporal 
lobe epilepsy for nonmedical readers. Epilepsy is defined as a syndrome of 
unprovoked recurrent seizures. In other words, epilepsy is diagnosed when 
a patient has a characteristic combination of different seizures and other 
related symptoms. A seizure is not a diagnosis of a disease, but a symptom 
of different medical conditions, and is defined as “a transient occurrence of 
signs and/or symptoms due to abnormal excessive or synchronous neuro-
nal activity in the brain” which can be detected by clinical manifestations, 
electroencephalographic recording, or both.28 In other words, a seizure is a 
transient neurological symptom caused by an abnormal and excessive elec-
trical activity in the brain. One can have a seizure without epilepsy, because a 
seizure can result from (be provoked by) many different medical conditions, 
such as a low sugar level or sodium level in the blood, and can occur as an 
isolated event. On the other hand, epilepsy, also known as seizure disorder, 
always manifests itself with seizures that are unprovoked and recurrent.
What we now understand as temporal lobe epilepsy is not a unitary dis-
ease entity. It is a subset of epileptic syndromes consisting of a characteristic 
combination of two types of seizures, simple partial seizures and complex 
paradigm of using modern knowledge and technologies to understand ancient dis-
eases is also widely used by paleopathologists.
27 According to Presti (2013: 221), “the question of the definition of epilepsy in 
the Greek medical texts of the classical period is far from being solved.”
28 Engel and Pedley 2008; Browne and Holmes 2008: 1; Fisher et al. 2005.
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partial seizures.29 The condition typically begins in childhood.30 The exces-
sive electrical activity of these seizures is localized in the temporal lobes. As 
a syndrome, not a disease, it can result from various underlying etiologies. 
One important distinguishing feature of temporal lobe epilepsy is that these 
partial seizures are nonconvulsive, not manifesting the classic clinical fea-
tures of epilepsy—falling down, twitching and jerking, and complete loss of 
consciousness and continence—unless the partial seizures of temporal lobe 
epilepsy secondarily generalize to the entire brain (secondary generalized 
seizure).31 As long as the patient does not develop a secondary generalized 
seizure, it is not easy to recognize these symptoms as epilepsy in the mean-
ing commonly known to laypersons.
Temporal lobe epilepsy as a syndrome has been recognized since the 
mid-nineteenth century, when there were no diagnostic technologies.32 
According to the medical historian Owsei Temkin, there is a passage sugges-
tive of temporal lobe epilepsy in the Hippocratic corpus, the Sacred Disease, 
the classic treatise on epilepsy. Yet the Hippocratic author did not associ-
ate such a condition with the sacred disease.33 The condition undoubtedly 
existed in the era of Hippocrates, a contemporary of Socrates, but most likely 
it was not recognized as a type of epilepsy. In the mid-nineteenth century, it 
was first recognized as a “dreamy state,” yet as usual with most other histor-
ical diagnostic classifications, it included many different conditions other 
than temporal lobe epilepsy. It was John Hughlings Jackson, a British neurol-
ogist and pioneering epileptologist, who established in the late nineteenth 
29 Note that the classification and naming of seizures and epilepsies have been 
constantly evolving. This essay uses those of the late twentieth century. Various alter-
native terminologies such as “psychomotor epilepsy,” “psychomotor seizure,” and 
“psychic seizure” were used in the past. In the twenty-first century, naming and clas-
sification continue to evolve following the evolution of diagnostic technologies. The 
critics may argue that applying such rapidly evolving diagnostic terms and classifi-
cation to a historical person is anachronistic and too speculative. That may be true 
for conditions in which the underlying pathophysiology itself has evolved, such as 
infectious diseases, genetic diseases, and many other disorders caused by changing 
environmental factors. But most basic manifestations of human pathophysiology, 
such as fever, cough, diarrhea, and jaundice, have never changed: it is our under-
standing, classification, terminology, and diagnostic technology that have evolved. 
The basic pathophysiology in the human body itself has not changed in historical 
times regardless of diverse terminologies and classifications. Seizure and epilepsy are 
such a basic human pathophysiology, regardless of how we name and classify them.
30 As discussed in the next section, this is one of the key features of the condition 
of Socrates.
31 Generalized seizures are commonly known as “grand mal.”
32 For a history of temporal lobe epilepsy, see Temkin 1971.
33 Temkin 1971: 316–317; Hippoc. Morb. sacr. 1.19–28; Hippocrates 1923: 141. The 
Hippocratic author gives those symptoms as examples of conditions that are no less 
sacred than the sacred disease itself, but that nobody thinks are sacred.
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century that the condition he variously named “epileptic dream,” “mental 
automatism,” and “dreamy state” originates in the temporal lobe.34
Simple partial seizure, one of the core manifestations of temporal lobe 
epilepsy, consists of recurrent brief episodes of various sensory experiences: 
seeing various images, hearing various sounds and voices, smelling certain 
smells, and tasting unusual tastes, for example.35 The term “simple” indicates 
the absence of impairment of consciousness, and “partial” indicates that the 
seizure involves only a part of the brain, not the entire brain. Simple partial 
seizure causes only brief intermittent sensory experiences without any other 
ill effect. The other core manifestation of temporal lobe epilepsy, complex 
partial seizure, involves various degrees of altered consciousness, confusion, 
dreamy state, and memory loss—hence it is “complex.”36 Patients with com-
plex partial seizure often appear to be in a state of trance or stupor, being 
partially responsive or completely unresponsive, or they may appear to be 
responding to their environment and continue ongoing activities with some-
what diminished capacity. Such activities are often automatic (automatism). 
But the patient exhibits few or no convulsive movements or losses of postural 
tone (the patient does not fall down). These patients are often partially or 
completely amnesic about the event afterward. Those episodes can be brief, 
lasting for seconds to minutes, but can occasionally be prolonged, some-
times for hours. Most experiences during seizures are subjective, so that 
bystanders may not notice anything abnormal. But automatism and altered 
consciousness can manifest themselves as certain odd behaviours, such as 
confused action, arrest of movement, and trancelike conditions.
How Is Socrates Diagnosed with Temporal Lobe Epilepsy?
Retrospective diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy in Socrates is purely 
a clinical diagnosis. It is solely based on his lifelong history of symptoms 
and behaviour, described mainly by Plato, and some by Xenophon, with a 
dubious contribution by Aristophanes. This diagnosis is a clinical pattern 
recognition by an experienced neurologist, and obviously not by modern 
technological diagnostics. Here, I have to provide a narrative history of my 
own encounter with the patient Socrates. 37
34 Temkin 1971: 344–346.
35 This corresponds with the recurrent voice that Socrates told us he had been 
hearing since childhood.
36 This corresponds with several of Socrates’ episodes of delirious confusion and 
memory loss, as detailed later.
37 The following account may appear too personal and anecdotal for an academic 
paper, but it is intentional, in order to demonstrate the reality of clinical diagnosis for 
nonclinical readers. To demonstrate how a medical diagnosis is actually made even 
to medical students, let alone to a lay audience, is not easy and simple. It is generally 
perceived that making a medical diagnosis is as simple as obtaining a diagnostic test 
and getting a positive or negative result. To the contrary, even in this age of medical 
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When I first encountered Socrates, I was a practicing neurologist, see-
ing many patients day in and day out, some of whom had temporal lobe 
epilepsy. By then, I had followed probably over 30–40 patients with tem-
poral lobe epilepsy throughout my career. They often gave me fascinating 
and memorable stories of their subjective experiences. These stories were so 
unique and characteristic that clinical history alone often gave me a reason-
able certainty of the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy. While new medi-
cations in modern times are mostly successful in controlling those episodes 
of sensory experiences and altered consciousness, my patients still told me 
of occasional breakthrough episodes when they missed a dose or two, and 
certainly recollected those experiences that occurred before they initiated 
medication.
While seeing these patients during the daytime, I also started my study 
of philosophy and ethics in the evenings as a foundation for the further study 
of medical ethics. Reading Plato was the very basis of my study project for 
philosophy. I had known Plato and Socrates only superficially until then. As 
I started reading from the Apology, and then Euthyphro and other early to 
middle dialogues, I could not help noticing the descriptions of the unusual 
behaviour and remarks of Socrates. They were very similar to what I had 
heard many times from my patients with temporal lobe epilepsy. One of the 
most representative descriptions was found in the Apology:
I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his 
deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and when-
ever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, 
but it never encourages me to do anything. (Apology 31d)
“Well, this is almost exactly what some of my patients told me,” I said 
to myself. One of my patients, who was a well-respected psychologist, for 
informatics and well-established diagnostic guidelines, the clinical diagnosis still 
requires a unique pattern recognition and probabilistic intuition of an experienced 
diagnostician, whose expertise can be transmitted only through many personal expe-
riences of similar patterns.
This section is meant to show how the classical sources triggered an experi-
enced diagnostician to generate a patient-relevant clinical hypothesis, also known 
as a clinical diagnosis, through pattern recognition. Through this personal narrative, 
I intend to show that physician–patient encounter and clinical decision-making are 
bound by intimate personal interaction at a specific time and place. Contrary to the 
expectation of critics of retrospective diagnosis, clinical decision-making and clinical 
diagnosis are fundamentally and inherently a personal and individualized enterprise. 
Personal narratives play a central role in such an enterprise. We clinicians immerse 
ourselves in patients’ subjective experience by listening to their narratives and reex-
perience their symptoms and suffering, while putting everything into the perspective 
of our own medical and scientific knowledge and the wealth of previous personal 
narratives of similar patients.
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example, said that when she started doing some physical activities, she occa-
sionally heard a very brief funny voice, and at the same time she had to stop 
the activity.38 It did not happen to her all the time, and she was not able to 
predict it. It started in her childhood, but she did not seek medical attention 
until her adulthood, when she started experiencing occasional episodes of 
confusion (complex partial seizure), which triggered her visit to a neurolo-
gist.39 I thought, therefore, that the story given by Socrates was very typical 
of temporal lobe epilepsy, but it could just have been my biased imagination. 
After all, when you have a hammer in your hand everything looks like a nail. 
So I tried to ignore this thought and continued to read on. But then I came 
across the descriptions of Socrates hearing the same voice again and again, 
and they all had the same characteristics. Soon, the entire Platonic corpus 
became the medical record of Socrates, and besides studying the Platonic 
philosophical theses, I became more and more interested in analyzing Pla-
to’s as well as Xenophon’s and Aristophanes’ descriptions of the behaviour 
of Socrates.
While hearing a brief intermittent and vague voice is characteristic of 
simple partial seizure, its presence alone is not convincing of the diagno-
sis of temporal lobe epilepsy. What I found convincing in the subsequent 
reading was the presence of the second type of seizure. This second type is 
complex partial seizure as I defined above. As described in the next section, 
there are at least three places in Plato’s corpus that depict such episodes in 
Socrates. Let us now go over the main diagnostic features described in the 
Platonic corpus.
Symptomatology of Socrates’ Neurological Disorder
As I mentioned above from Apology 31d, Socrates had recurrent episodes 
ever since he was a child of hearing a voice that commanded him to stop or 
refrain from certain actions.40 According to Plato, the voice, or “daimonion,” 
visited Socrates unexpectedly, abruptly,41 and irrelevantly to the importance 
of the context in which he was placed.42 The duration of this episode was 
usually very brief, probably a few seconds to a minute at most, and it often 
38 The exact phenomenology of stopping an action seems very difficult for these 
patients to explain. My anecdotal experiences with them suggest that some sort of 
discomfort prevents them from continuing the action. It is unclear whether this was 
the case with Socrates or he actually heard vague words such as “stop!” or “don’t!” Nev-
ertheless, Socrates never attributed exact words to the voice (except in the Theages 
and the Xenophonic corpus).
39 For further story of her diagnosis and treatment, see footnote 59 below.
40 Pl. Ap. 31d; Pl. Theages 128d; Xen. Mem. IV.7; Xen. Ap. 4.
41 Pl. Phdr. 242b–c; Pl. Euthyd. 272e–273a.
42 Pl. Ap. 31d; 40a “[daimonion] opposed me, even in small matters, ... but now 
that ... I was faced with what one might think ... the worst of evils, my divine sign has 
not opposed me”; Pl. Euthyd 272e–273a.
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came when he was about to initiate an action or speech,43 though the visit 
was quite unpredictable. The voice seems to have been inarticulate; Socrates 
did not attribute any specific words to it, except in the Theages and in the 
Xenophonic corpus. Socrates thought the daimonion was almost unique to 
him,44 and he never identified the source of the voice.
As stated above, this manifestation is considered typical of simple partial 
seizure. In general, seizures are precipitated by certain very specific factors, 
and the patient can anticipate when a seizure might come because of these 
known precipitating factors, though the prediction is not always correct. 
There are many different precipitants described in the neurological litera-
ture. For example, some patients have seizures in response to certain sounds, 
certain visual stimulation such as lights and images, and as in the case of 
Socrates, certain actions or speech.45 Hyperventilation associated with those 
actions, particularly talking, could also be a common precipitating factor. 
The major differential diagnosis for such a symptom is the auditory hallu-
cinations of psychosis. Schizophrenia and mania are the most important in 
this category, while ear diseases with unusual tinnitus and chronic alcohol-
ism are much less likely possibilities. We will come back to differential diag-
nosis later.
In addition to these descriptions consistent with simple partial seizure, 
there are at least three apparently independent descriptions that are consis-
tent with complex partial seizure. The first episode is found in the begin-
ning of the Symposium, 174e–175c, where there is a vivid account of Socrates’ 
bizarre behaviour with testimony from a close friend. The story begins with 
a scene where Socrates leaves for Agathon’s house to join a drinking party. 
While Socrates was walking briskly (recall that his usual precipitating factor 
was physical activity), somehow he lost track of what he was doing and wan-
dered into a neighbour’s porch, where he stood and was unresponsive to calls 
for a while. His close friend Aristodemus testified that “it’s one of his habits: 
every now and then he just goes off like that and stands motionless, where 
he happens to be. I’m sure he’ll come in very soon, so don’t disturb him; let 
him be.”46 This is most likely a complex partial seizure precipitated by exer-
cise. The episode was triggered by walking briskly, and in other contexts, by 
standing up or talking (see below, Phaedrus 263c–d). Physical activity seems 
to be the common precipitating factor for both simple and complex partial 
43 Pl Phdr. 242b–c; Pl. Euthyd. 272e–273a.
44 Pl. Resp. 6 496c: “it has happened to no one before me, or to only a very few.”
45 Sturm et al. 2002.
46 Pl. Symp. 175a–b. Strikingly, even today this observation is commonly reported 
by family members and caregivers who are familiar with the spells of their loved ones 
with temporal lobe epilepsy. This is also advice most neurologists give to patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy and their caregivers: there is no need to panic over such 
abnormal behaviour as long as the patient is in a safe environment, because it is 
almost invariably self-limited and reversible.
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seizures in the case of Socrates, which is not unusual given the close relation-
ship between the two types of seizure. Sometimes a simple partial seizure 
occurs as an aura of a subsequent complex partial seizure.
The second episode is found in Phaedrus 263c–d. After delivering his 
first speech on love, Socrates is about to cross the river and leave, when he 
experiences the daimonion. He understands this visit as a sign that he has 
committed an offence against the gods in his first speech.47 Socrates retracts 
the first speech and delivers the second speech, which is the complete 
antithesis of the first. But the interesting fact, which is noticed not by Soc-
rates but by Phaedrus, his interlocutor and witness to the episode, is that 
Socrates cannot remember the details of his first speech “at all because I 
[Socrates] was completely possessed by the gods.” He asks Phaedrus, “Did I 
define love at the beginning of my speech?”48 Socrates also cannot remember 
the details of the speech of Lysias which he heard earlier, asking Phaedrus to 
read the same introduction twice (a total of three times in this dialogue).49 
While most commentators take Plato in this context as simply depicting 
Socrates playfully pretending to be forgetful, or perhaps an instance of Soc-
ratic irony, Socrates’ own words about his state of mind during the speech 
suggests that he was indeed experiencing some disturbance. He says during 
the first speech, “don’t you think, as I do, that I’m in the grip of something 
divine? [...] don’t be surprised if I’m quite taken by the Nymphs’ madness 
as I go on with the speech. I’m on the edge of speaking in dithyrambs as it 
is.”50 Another pertinent fact is that this experience roughly coincides with 
the visit of the daimonion, which triggered his conversion from the first to 
the second speech. It is quite possible that Socrates was indeed in amnesic 
confusion around the time he was visited with the daimonion and felt that he 
was “completely possessed by the gods.”51 The whole episode is suggestive of a 
combination of a simple partial seizure, in which Socrates heard the daimon-
ion without losing consciousness or memory, and a complex partial seizure, 
in which he had altered consciousness and memory impairment while con-
fusedly delivering the unintended first speech as a manifestation of autom-
atism, around the same time. Probably he was in and out of complex partial 
seizure while he was speaking. He seemed to have some partial recollection 
of his phenomenology during the first speech, as he explained later, “almost 
from the beginning of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy feeling.”52 
47 Pl. Phdr. 242b–c.
48 Pl. Phdr. 263d.
49 Pl. Phdr. 262e and 263d–e.
50 Pl. Phdr. 238c–d.
51 Pl. Phdr. 238d.
52 Pl. Phdr. 242d. An immediate objection from the critics would be that there is 
no point in taking Plato’s depiction of Socrates so literally in this context, because the 
Phaedrus is after all a drama created by Plato, and not intended to be interpreted as 
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I further speculate, based on anecdotal reports from some of my patients, 
that this uneasy feeling or discomfort is the very reason Socrates had to stop 
an action that had triggered the daimonion. In other words, if he continued 
the action or speech despite the visit of the daimonion, he would enter this 
uncomfortable situation, which is the onset of mental confusion, or “the grip 
of divine” in his own words, due to complex partial seizure.53
Complex and simple partial seizures are sometimes not clearly demar-
cated clinically and electrophysiologically. These two can coexist, or one can 
follow immediately after the other. In such a series of seizures, the exces-
sive electric firing spreads from one area of the temporal lobe to another. 
The phenomenology of seizure is a matter of the propagation of electrical 
activity between the temporal neocortex (outer surface of the lobe), where a 
sensory function is activated with normal consciousness, which is a simple 
partial seizure, and the mesial (inner surface) temporal lobe or the limbic 
cortex, whose activation alters consciousness and memory, which is a com-
plex partial seizure. The patient may still appear to be speaking and behav-
ing normally during such a series of seizures, but in retrospect he is found to 
have been intermittently in a confused and amnesic state. As already noted 
earlier, the common precipitating factors of Socrates’ simple and complex 
partial seizures are physical activities and speech, and this event in the 
Phaedrus also confirms these precipitants (delivering a speech and trying to 
cross a river). It might also be relevant to this context that seizures have been 
interpreted as god or spirit “possession” or “grip,” which is almost universal 
across cultures and historical times.54
The third description of episodic neurological symptoms is narrated by 
Alcibiades, Socrates’ lover and student, in Symposium 220c–e. While serving 
in a military campaign with Alcibiades, Socrates was standing in one spot 
all day as if he was thinking about some problem. This caught the attention 
of his fellow soldiers, but Socrates did not pay attention to them, nor did he 
come to meals or go to bed. It lasted until the next morning. Unfortunately, 
unlike the other two episodes, the description of the phenomenology lacks 
an accurate description of medically interesting behaviour. I address the problem of 
the “Platonic factor” just before the Conclusion and reply to this objection. For now, 
I agree with the critics that the entire drama is Plato’s creation, but I submit that it is 
still possible that Plato framed his own philosophical themes inside the framework of 
Socrates’ well-known pattern of behaviour and remarks to make the drama realistic.
53 See also footnote 38 for the phenomenology of stopping action. This may also 
be what happened to Socrates when he was walking briskly to the party (Pl. Symp 
174e–175c). It seems possible that if he had stopped walking at the onset of the first 
symptom when he “lost himself in thought” (174e), he could have avoided going into 
a prolonged trance on the neighbor’s porch.
54 Temkin 1971. It seems to make perfect sense for Socrates to name simple partial 
seizure as “divine sign” and complex partial seizure as “divine possession” or “divine 
grip,” as they are closely related each other.
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enough details, which makes diagnosis of the seizure type, if it was a sei-
zure, somewhat more conjectural. However, its similarity to the episode in 
the neighbour’s porch before the drinking party in Symposium 174e–175c, 
which had typical features of complex partial seizure, and the testimony by 
Aristodemus that this happened randomly and recurrently to Socrates, ren-
ders it plausible to consider this episode as an unusually prolonged version 
of complex partial seizure or complex partial status epilepticus, a type of 
nonconvulsive status epilepticus.55 Status epilepticus is defined as “a con-
dition characterized by epileptic seizures that are sufficiently prolonged or 
repeated at sufficiently brief intervals so as to produce an unvarying and 
enduring epileptic condition.”56 Complex partial status epilepticus is a pro-
longed episode or a series of frequently repeating episodes of complex partial 
seizure, which can last up to many days.57 The major differential diagnosis of 
this description would be absence status epilepticus, another type of non-
convulsive status epilepticus, and catatonia, or catatonic stupor, a symptom 
of psychosis, which Bertrand Russell called “cataleptic trance” and suspected 
Socrates had.58
Now we have seen two apparently independent episodic neurologic 
symptoms, simple partial seizure and complex partial seizure, that converge 
into one syndromic diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy. However, a diagnos-
tician still has to go through one more crucial step before diagnosing this 
patient with temporal lobe epilepsy with reasonable certainty. Obviously, we 
cannot subject Socrates to modern technological diagnostic methods, such 
as electroencephalography or magnetic resonance imaging, which is the 
usual next step.59 But at the very least we need to consider differential diag-
nosis and establish a probabilistic judgment that other diagnoses are less 
likely than what we suspect.
55 Williamson 2008.
56 Williamson 2008: 677.
57 Cockerell et al. 1994.
58 See footnote 11. Russell 1947. Almost all past attempts to explain Socrates’ 
behaviour in neuropsychiatric terms ended up with a concept in the broad spectrum 
of major psychosis (“insanity,” “hallucination,” “delusion,” “cataplexy or catatonia,” 
“madness,” etc.).
59 However, negative tests do not necessarily rule out temporal lobe epilepsy, 
and sometimes clinical diagnosis takes precedent in such cases. For example, the 
well-respected psychologist I introduced earlier who had symptoms very similar to 
those of Socrates initially had a completely normal EEG (brain wave test) and MRI 
(brain imaging test). She went through trials of medications, and her seizures com-
pletely stopped with one medication that is highly effective in treating temporal lobe 
epilepsy. After two negative EEG tests, the third EEG test finally revealed occasional 
“temporal spikes,” which are the diagnostic feature of temporal lobe epilepsy, and 
confirmed the clinical diagnosis. In this sense, the diagnosis of Socrates without any 
technological tests may not be so farfetched after all, even in today’s practice.
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As mentioned above, the major competing diagnosis60 is major psycho-
sis, particularly schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations and catatonic 
stupor. While the duration of the episodes of confusion and their abrupt 
onset and cessation, and the vagueness of the message of the daimonion, 
are much more typical for temporal lobe epilepsy than for schizophrenia, 
the critical key feature of Socrates that almost rules out schizophrenia and 
major psychosis is the fact that this condition started in Socrates’ childhood 
and remained stable and intermittent without signs of serious progression 
through his old age. As stated above, temporal lobe epilepsy typically starts 
in childhood, but childhood-onset schizophrenia is very rare, and the prog-
nosis of those rare cases is very poor, even in modern times when the condi-
tion is treated.61 Socrates’ robust physical and mental health through age 70 
and his accomplished career and settled marital life are almost unthinkable 
in a lifelong schizophrenic without the benefit of modern therapeutics. In 
contrast, this clinical course is still possible in the case of temporal lobe epi-
lepsy, as long as it is mild.62
Let us take stock of the diagnostic features at this time. Table 1 summa-
rizes the diagnostic features in the texts with corresponding seizure types.63
It is the fact that Socrates was habitually experiencing, since childhood 
and throughout his life without major physical or mental disabilities, the 
two types of seizure that are both known to originate in the temporal lobe 
and known to happen in typical patients with temporal lobe epilepsy that 
convinced me of the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy. It is this syndromic 
convergence of apparently unrelated events, described in different places in 
the Platonic corpus, without meaningful connections among those in the 
60 The critics of this theory would insist that the major competing diagnosis is 
that Socrates was neurologically normal: his remarks and behaviour had no medi-
cal basis. My response is: Why, then,  have scholarsbeen puzzled by this “problem” 
for centuries and unable to reach any reasonable agreement using a nonmedical 
explanation?
61 Remschmidt et al. 2007. Note also that it is entirely unclear if such a rare con-
dition really existed in ancient times.
62 Many accomplished professionals have lifelong temporal lobe epilepsy. Those 
people in general have a mild and stable clinical course. One possible explanation 
of the mildness of Socrates’ case is that there is no record that he had secondary 
generalized seizures, a hallmark of a wider involvement of the brain. While the lack 
of such a report does not entail the evidence of absence, since generalized seizures 
(grand mal) are so easily recognizable in a layperson’s eyes even in the era of Socrates, 
commentators would have mentioned it as a typical feature of the sacred disease if he 
had one. This is also the reason that in contrast to Naso and Vera (1996), I conclude 
that Socrates did not have the sacred disease as known by the Hippocratic author.
63 Adapted from Muramoto and Englert 2006.
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Table 1. Seizure types, diagnostic features, and textual sources of Socrates’ temporal 
lobe epilepsy
Seizures Diagnostic features Textual source
Simple partial seizure 
(SPS)
Childhood onset, repetitive 
and recurrent
Apology 31d, Theages 128d
Voice commanding Socrates 
to stop his action
Apology 31d, Theages 128d
Voice indicating Socrates’ 
duty
Apology (Xenophon) 12
Irrelevant to the importance 
of context
Apology 31d, 40a–c
Unexpected and abrupt 
occurrence
Phaedrus 242b–c
Euthydemus 272e–273a
Brief duration of episode Euthydemus 272e–273a
Socrates felt it unique to him 
or rare for others
Republic 6 496c
Provocation by initiating 
action or speech
Phaedrus 242b–c
Euthydemus 272e–273a
Complex partial 
seizure (CPS)
Habitual and sporadic 
occurrence
Symposium 174e–175c
Socrates goes off and stands 
motionless
Unresponsiveness
Predictable and spontaneous 
recovery
Amnesic confusion 
(series of SPS and 
CPS)
No memory of speech Socra-
tes just delivered
Phaedrus 263c–d
He felt “completely possessed 
by the gods”
Occurrence close to an epi-
sode of SPS
Complex partial 
status
Standing outside all day, no 
eating or sleeping
Symposium 220c–e
Appeared to try to solve a 
problem
Disconnected and unrespon-
sive to environment
Onlookers were mystified
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mind of the author, who had no knowledge of temporal lobe epilepsy, that 
makes this diagnosis particularly plausible.64
But is this still just the biased observation of one diagnostician? In gen-
eral, many clinicians actually diagnose or at least strongly suspect that a cer-
tain person seen or met or heard about has a medical condition, without 
formally examining that person, when the story and manifestation are very 
typical or diagnostic of such a condition. Most of these diagnoses by pattern 
recognition, or so-called “Augenblick” diagnoses, are correct so long as the 
presentation is as typical as seen in textbooks, but of course they are not per-
fect. Here, I have to emphasize that the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy 
in Socrates is just like that. As a pattern recognition by an experienced diag-
nostician, it is by no means a perfect and absolute diagnosis. But it still works 
as the first diagnostic hypothesis most of the time even today. Such a diag-
nostic hypothesis usually leads to further diagnostic testing to confirm the 
hypothesis.65 In the case of Socrates, while we cannot subject him to modern 
technological diagnostics, I argue that this first diagnostic hypothesis is, in 
a sense, more plausible than those of my patients whom I saw in my clinic, 
because almost no patient can give at the first visit such a detailed lifelong 
history of seizures from multiple witnesses. In other words, the history given 
by Plato that I reviewed above is much more thorough and informative than 
I could get from most of my patients at their first visits before diagnostic 
testing. (Of course, it took a much longer time and greater effort to gather 
this diagnostic information from the ancient sources.) This is an important 
advantage of retrospective diagnosis that the critics miss. Let us now turn to 
the next examination to see if this theory can make any contribution to our 
understanding of the historical Socrates.
The Historical Socrates Reconsidered
How did his temporal lobe epilepsy possibly influence his thoughts, remarks, 
and behaviour? Did it contribute to his conviction and execution? Such 
questions can never be answered definitively even today when all medical 
information is known about one individual. In this respect, I wholeheart-
edly agree with the antireductionist that human thoughts, behaviour, and 
social interactions are too complex to be explained away, or reduced, by 
medical explanation. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, I can make some 
64 One might call the description of these symptoms “double-blind description,” 
as neither Socrates, the patient, nor Plato, the describer, had any idea about the diag-
nosis, yet two people blindly described so accurately the very specific phenomenol-
ogy of temporal lobe epilepsy.
65 Nevertheless, as noted in footnote 59, this process of confirmation through 
diagnostic testing is not that simple. Often the first test is negative in mild case, 
and these cases are treated based on clinical impression alone. Modern technological 
diagnostics are not necessarily the gold standard of medical diagnosis.
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contributions toward filling gaps in trying to answer the question of what 
kind of person Socrates really was, or the so-called Socratic problem.66
The first and most important contribution I can make from this theory 
is that his personal god, or the daimonion, was not the creation of Socrates, 
but was his genuine, authentic experience. It is not at all bizarre or enig-
matic, but typical of a now well-known neurological symptom. The visit of 
the daimonion was not something he could control or bring on, and Socrates 
himself was baffled by its unexpected visits or the absence thereof. In this 
sense, he was unjustifiably accused of something he could not control. Soc-
rates simply remained true to his own genuine experiences throughout the 
trial, even until his death. If Socrates had learned the association between 
the voice and his initiation of certain actions through his lifelong experi-
ences, and if this association was sometimes predictable and sometimes 
not, and if, when he had continued to act despite the daimonion, he may 
have experienced some very uncomfortable feeling of confusion, which is 
the onset of complex partial seizure, it seems quite understandable that he 
interpreted the voice as trying to turn him away from certain actions. As 
was customary in those days, it was quite natural to interpret such warnings 
as a god’s commands.67 While Socrates himself described the daimonion as 
“familiar” and unique to himself, it was never as familiar and unique as his 
own creations: he never owned it. Socrates never said what the daimonion 
exactly was but only described how it came to him. This explanation was 
definitely not appealing to the jury, and only instigated the accusation of 
“introducing new deities.”
Another important contribution is that at least some of Socrates’ noto-
rious behaviour, wandering into a neighbour’s porch and standing as if he 
were frozen in a totally inappropriate context and not continuing with his 
expected actions, or being confused and forgetful about the wrong speech 
he just delivered, can be accounted for by his complex partial seizures. 
Undoubtedly, as the testimony of Aristodemus indicated,68 Socrates had 
such episodes of bizarre behaviour many times more than Plato described, 
which probably helped establish his notoriety of “strangeness” (atopia).69
66 Guthrie 1971: 6.
67 As mentioned earlier, Socrates may have considered such experiences of a 
complex partial seizure as “the grip of the divine” or “divine possession,” which was 
the prevailing concept of seizure and epilepsy in his time, as told by Hippocrates. 
And if a simple partial seizure is the warning against the “divine possession,” it is 
logical for Socrates to call such voices a “divine sign.” Yet he never had a secondary 
generalized seizure, as far as we can tell from ancient sources, which is the hallmark 
of the sacred disease. Socrates’ claim of a “divine” sign without the qualifying overt 
manifestation of the “divine” disease might have been considered unacceptable in his 
community.
68 Pl. Symp. 175a–-b.
69 Vlastos 1991: 1.
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The next consideration is what kind of a person Socrates possibly could 
have been if he indeed had temporal lobe epilepsy. If temporal lobe epilepsy 
is mild, which was likely the case in Socrates, as stated above, he might not 
have had any visible abnormality as a result of the underlying seizure disorder. 
There are many normally functioning people today, such as highly accom-
plished professionals, artists, and intellectuals, who live almost normal lives 
with temporal lobe epilepsy. Socrates’ temporal lobe epilepsy may not have 
had any impact on his personality and intellectual accomplishment as long 
as it was mild. However, depending on the severity of this condition, patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy are also known to manifest several different 
symptoms. Is there any reason to suspect that Socrates had other symptoms 
that were associated with his temporal lobe epilepsy beyond hearing voices 
and occasional episodes of confusion, amnesia, and strange behaviour? 
We do not have sufficient evidence to answer this question unequivocally. 
However, there are several lines of circumstantial evidence that raise the 
possibility that his temporal lobe epilepsy might have influenced Socrates’ 
personality. From here on, my discussion is certainly more speculative than 
my account of the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy itself.70
Many important neuropsychological functions are located in the 
temporal lobes, including language perception and comprehension, audi-
tory perception, memory, integration of visual information, and emotion. 
Depending on the extent of the lesion in the temporal lobes, all these func-
tions can be affected. However, the situation in the patient with temporal 
lobe epilepsy is more complicated than simple damage in the temporal 
lobes, such as tumours, strokes, or brain injury. Because the lesions respon-
sible for temporal lobe epilepsy are usually small, sometimes of microscopic 
size, they may not cause any tangible loss of function. A more important 
functional change in temporal lobe epilepsy is the sequel to the chronic and 
repetitive excitation of the neurons in the temporal lobes, also known as a 
“kindling effect.” Such chronic and repetitive electrical excitation can result 
in a complex conglomeration of enhanced and diminished functions, which 
are responsible for various neuropsychiatric complications of chronic tem-
poral lobe epilepsy.71
The “epileptic personality” and “temporal lobe personality” have been 
described in the neurological and psychiatric literature for over a century, 
including the description by the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin in the 
70 Some readers may wonder why we discuss such a speculative account of per-
sonality here. Besides a possible resolution of the discrepancy between Aristophanes 
and Plato/Xenophon in their portrayal of Socrates as discussed below, epilepsy has 
been implicated in other historical religious leaders, most notably the apostle Paul 
and Mohammed (Saver and Rabin 1997). Our insight into the personality of Socrates, 
who was also highly religious, might shed some light on the ongoing discussion on 
the relationship between religiosity and epilepsy.
71 Blumer 1975.
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early twentieth century.72 Fyodor Dostoevsky is considered one of the famous 
figures to have had an epileptic personality.73 D. Frank Benson (neurologist) 
and Dietrich Blumer (psychiatrist) together describe the epileptic personal-
ity succinctly as follows:
A complex syndrome of personality and behavior changes fol-
lows (or rarely, precedes) the onset of temporal lobe seizures, or 
of generalized seizures with presumed involvement of the tempo-
ral lobes. While sexual arousal and response tend to be reduced, 
there is often a profound deepening of emotional responses. This 
deepening includes penting up and episodic discharge of anger 
and rage on the one hand, and intensification of ethical-religious 
feelings on the other. The need to be good-natured, helpful, and 
God-fearing is much more prominent than the highly publicized 
violence-proneness. The deepening of emotional responses affects 
much of the patient’s psychic life. The so-called epileptic “viscosity” 
may be viewed as a result of the intensified ethical sense: there are 
no trifles; the right or wrong of every item needs to be considered 
along with all ramifications; no issue can be easily dropped; these 
patients become long-winded in speech and often feel the need to 
put down their thought in lengthy writings; they tend to be remark-
ably without humor, in general, and without appreciation of sexual 
humor in particular.74
I quote this rather long description of epileptic personality because some, 
but not all, features are reminiscent of the personality of Socrates.
The late Norman Geschwind, the famous behavioural neurologist, 
together with Stephen Waxman, described four features of the personality 
traits of temporal lobe epilepsy: hyposexuality, hyperreligiosity, hypermo-
rality, and hypergraphia.75 Profound interest in philosophical issues, which 
are likely related to hyperreligiosity and hypermorality, is also seen in these 
cases. Because of Geschwind’s contribution to the delineation of the per-
sonality disorder of temporal lobe epilepsy, the syndrome is often called 
the Geschwind syndrome. Typical cases of the Geschwind syndrome in the 
population of temporal lobe epilepsy are considered uncommon, and its 
specificity to temporal lobe epilepsy has been challenged in the neurology 
72 Kraepelin 1904.
73 Hughes 2005; Geschwind 1984.
74 Blumer and Benson 1975: 165.
75 Waxman and Geschwind 1975.
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literature.76 But many epileptologists and neuropsychiatrists dealing with 
temporal lobe epilepsy acknowledge its existence in clinical experience.77
By reviewing the above description of the personality and behavioural 
features of temporal lobe epilepsy by Benson and Blumer, and the traits of 
the Geschwind syndrome, we cannot help noticing a certain resemblance 
to Socrates’ personality. There is no need to mention Socrates’ “hyperreligi-
osity” and “hypermorality,” and his intense interest in and meticulous care 
for philosophical issues. Regarding Socrates’ “hyposexuality,” we find in his 
discussion of love in the Symposium and Phaedrus that his interest is not 
in carnal love but in asexual love, which is the prototype of what we know 
as “Platonic love.” One conspicuous exception to the typical temporal lobe 
personality is the lack of “hypergraphia.” In fact, Socrates left no written 
document. However, his untiring, inquisitive, and unremitting questioning 
could be interpreted as an oral version of hypergraphia, or more generally 
“hyperdetailed, lengthy, excessive, and persistent verbal output.”78 As seen in 
the above quote, Benson and Blumer suggest that hypergraphia might be a 
collateral manifestation of long-windedness of speech, which Socrates most 
likely had. The other conspicuous absences in Socrates, in Plato’s and Xeno-
phon’s portrayals, are mood swings, temper tantrum, and rage, which are 
also described in the temporal lobe personality and the epileptic personality. 
One hint that Socrates might have exhibited at least some of the traits of the 
temporal lobe personality may come from the portrayal of Socrates by Aris-
tophanes in his comedy the Clouds. If Aristophanes wanted to ridicule and 
lampoon Socrates by caricaturing his undesirable personality traits, some 
features of the temporal lobe personality would have been an easy target for 
him. If we look at Socrates in the Clouds through this lens, it might be said 
that his hyperreligiosity, hypermorality, and “viscosity” are expressed in a 
very distorted fashion.79
76 See a debate between Devinsky and Najjar 1999 and Blumer 1999.
77 Benson 1991: 420. My personal anecdotal observation is that the prevalence of 
temporal lobe personality is declining in modern times, as most patients with tem-
poral lobe epilepsy are effectively treated from childhood, and the long-term sequel 
to this condition is diminishing.
78 Benson 1991: 413.
79 Regarding hyperreligiosity, the clouds in the comedy might be viewed as 
the distorted representation of Socrates’ personal deity (see Edmunds 1986). As for 
hypermorality, teaching sophistry might be a twisted caricature of Socrates’ unique 
and unconventional morality. “Viscosity” is a term frequently used in psychiatric 
literature to describe a behavioural trait of the temporal lobe personality, which is 
explained in the above quote of Blumer and Benson 1975: “there are no trifles; the 
right or wrong of every item needs to be considered along with all ramifications; no 
issue can be easily dropped.” In the Clouds, his tenacious questioning about trivial 
details of natural sciences and grammar might be a representation of this trait.
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The flip side of this speculation is that, in contrast to Aristophanes’ por-
trayal of Socrates, which is very pathetic, Plato’s and Xenophon’s Socrates 
might be viewed as “too good” and too exemplary a personality for a chronic 
epileptic. It has been widely accepted among Socratic scholars that a sub-
stantial portion of Plato’s Socrates has been modified by the “Platonic factor” 
for various reasons, including Plato’s own philosophical agenda, which he 
wanted to put in the mouth of Socrates, his need for a perfectly moral, virtu-
ous, temperate, and religious Socrates for the dramatization of his dialogues, 
and above all, his overwhelming admiration of his best teacher.80 Likewise, 
Xenophon’s Socrates might have been distorted by his intense admiration 
of the late Socrates; Xenophon wrote those dialogues almost as eulogies to 
defend and clear Socrates’ name, and mostly from second-hand stories. On 
the other hand, Aristophanes, whose reliability in providing information 
on the historic Socrates has been largely rejected, might have been exag-
gerating certain features of the historic Socrates that the other two authors 
downplayed in their dialogues. This conjecture, however, is by no means a 
straightforward implication of the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy.
The Problem of the Platonic Factor
Finally, I deal with important criticisms in relation to the Platonic factor. My 
argument that Socrates had temporal lobe epilepsy relies almost exclusively 
on Plato’s descriptions of Socrates’ behaviour and remarks. The critics would 
point out that if Plato’s description is considered embellished by his bias, 
which is widely accepted by Socratic scholars, our diagnosis of temporal lobe 
epilepsy may not be so reliable after all. My reply to this objection is as fol-
lows. First, the descriptions of Socrates’ simple partial seizure or the daimon-
ion are unlikely to be embellished because this was already widely known 
among the public and was almost a requisite and distinguishing feature of 
Socrates. Moreover, the daimonion is indispensable in Plato’s discussion of 
Socrates’ religion. Thus, it is unlikely that Plato and Xenophon significantly 
altered this feature.
Second, and in contrast, the three descriptions of complex partial sei-
zure seem less straightforward. Still, the two episodes in the Symposium 
(174e–175c, 220c–e) are conveyed by multiple witnesses, Aristodemus and 
Agathon in the scene at the drinking party, and Alcibiades and fellow sol-
diers in the scene at the military camp. The presence of multiple contempo-
raneous witnesses and accounts makes it less likely, in my view, that these 
accounts are entirely fictions created by Plato as opposed to narratives based 
on public knowledge, at least to some extent. A more significant challenge is 
encountered in interpreting the episode of confusion in the Phaedrus 263c–
d, since the entire dialogue seems to be a fiction consisting of a private con-
versation of only two men, Socrates and Phaedrus. What might have been 
the reason that Plato portrayed Socrates as being confused and delivering a 
80 Brickhouse and Smith 2004; Vlastos 1991; Guthrie 1971.
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wrong speech first, and then as becoming partially amnesic about it, asking 
embarrassingly confused questions? As mentioned earlier, a common inter-
pretation would be that this is only a comical and playful interlude of no 
import, or an instance of Socratic irony. But this explanation does not answer 
why Socrates has to be so obviously confused and disoriented in this por-
trayal, as opposed to his usual pretended ignorance. Besides the space lim-
itation, since this author is not qualified to offer any further exegetical and 
literary interpretations, and the Phaedrus has been the subject of intense 
study by numerous scholars, I humbly offer several possibilities and leave 
them for further study by qualified experts.
The present medical interpretation of Phaedrus 263c–d holds that Plato 
simply used Socrates’ habitual episode of confusion and amnesia, which was 
recognized by then as his hallmark, to depict the protagonist Socrates in a 
way more realistic to the historical Socrates.81 Plato needed to put two con-
tradicting speeches on love in the mouth of the same protagonist Socrates 
consecutively in the same dialogue. What else would be a better framework 
of such a sudden conversion than using the well-known hallmark of Socra-
tes, the daimonion and an episode of delirium? It is realistic for the portrayal 
of the protagonist Socrates, and at the same time instrumental in introduc-
ing his sudden conversion in the drama.
A more calculated dramatic effect is also a possibility.82 One of the most 
important themes of the Phaedrus is divine madness, which Plato may 
have considered an ideal attribute of the philosopher. As such, Plato may 
have wanted to depict Socrates as a superimposed image of being gripped 
by divine madness when he became delirious while delivering the speech 
against divine madness. Another speculation is that Plato may have con-
sidered Socrates’ divine voice (daimonion) and divine grip (delirium, or 
confusion and amnesia) as entirely positive attributes of the divinely mad 
philosopher, Socrates, as opposed to the symptoms of a nonphilosopher 
afflicted by human madness, which is an undesirable illness.83 In other 
words, Plato may have portrayed Socrates as the embodiment of divine mad-
ness. The problem of this interpretation, however, is that the “madness” dis-
played by Socrates in Plato’s portrayal has every feature of human madness, 
namely disturbed human cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, this may not be a 
81 In other words, these descriptions of Socrates’ odd behaviour are no more 
likely to be “tainted” by the Platonic factor than other peculiar hallmarks of the his-
torical Socrates, including the conspicuously unusual face, strolling barefoot in Ath-
ens in dirty clothes, and other unfavorable features of Socrates that Plato did not 
refrain from incorporating.
82 I am indebted to an anonymous reader of Mouseion for the consideration of 
madness as a widely used trope of philosophers in ancient sources. For further dis-
cussion on madness in Plato’s work, see Jouanna (2013: 103), Ahonen (2014: 38), and 
Thumiger (2017: 44).
83 Cf. Ahonen 2014: 40.
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problem if the difference between the two types of madness is their origins, 
not their symptomatology.
Conclusion
There is a reasonable certainty that the historical Socrates was an epileptic, 
suffering from temporal lobe epilepsy, and his daimonion was most likely the 
symptom of simple partial seizure, one of the common symptoms of tempo-
ral lobe epilepsy. The second type of seizure of temporal lobe epilepsy, com-
plex partial seizure, most likely manifested itself as his habitual confused 
behaviour, which established his notoriety for “strangeness.” This theory 
could potentially fill the seemingly irreconcilable gap between the bizarre 
and irrational Socrates on one hand and the perfectly rational and virtuous 
Socrates on the other, or the so-called Socratic problem. I further speculate, 
based on the epilepsy theory, that the personality of the historical Socrates 
might have had some features of Aristophanes’ Socrates, even though they 
were exaggerated out of proportion in the Clouds.
Does this theory give any new insight into the trial and execution of 
Socrates? I do not know the answer for sure, and I would like to leave this 
question to be decided by the community of Socratic scholars. One thing 
this theory indicates is that one of the specifications of the charge of impi-
ety against Socrates, the introduction of new deities, was an unwarranted 
accusation according to our contemporary standards. But beyond this point, 
all I can say, based on this theory, is that the underlying neurological con-
dition, temporal lobe epilepsy, likely influenced significantly the behaviour 
and remarks of Socrates throughout his life. How this information can be 
incorporated into Socratic scholarship remains to be seen.84
Finally, as a postscript, I would like to share one observation that struck 
me throughout this research. That is the remarkable accuracy of Plato in 
describing the symptoms of simple and complex partial seizures. His vivid 
descriptions of those episodes are remarkably accurate when we consider 
that Plato probably did not know much about seizures and epilepsy, beyond 
what the Hippocratic author described in The Sacred Disease, in which the 
84 I would like to remind the readers of my earlier statement that this theory is 
not meant to be a reductionism or to refute or replace other theories, but to comple-
ment them (footnote 22). This medical theory can and should be incorporated into 
other theories to the extent possible. For example, historians provide a theory that 
Socrates was tried and executed as a scapegoat of the political struggle between the 
democrats and the remnants or supporters of the Thirty (Hughes 2011; Waterfield 
2009a; 2009b). This theory is by no means incompatible with the present medical 
theory, because a made-up accusation is not at all uncommon in politically moti-
vated trials. In other words, whatever political, social, or religious reasons might have 
played a crucial role, Socrates’ eccentric and nonconforming remarks and behaviour 
must have been the easiest way to condemn this man who had, unbeknownst to 
everybody including himself, an undiagnosed neurological condition as the reason 
for such behaviour.
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author suggests that similar manifestations of temporal lobe epilepsy were 
not considered sacred in those days. At the same time, it is also worth men-
tioning that Socrates’ own description of his daimonion was also remarkably 
accurate and authentic in light of the current knowledge of simple partial 
seizure. It seems to me that these findings are another piece of evidence 
that these ancient philosophers had extraordinarily keen eyes and observant 
minds.
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